“Ranking Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions”

Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore

Hongkun Ma, Shandong University

Zhe Wang, National University of Singapore

In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with incomplete information. There are two symmetric players whose values can be high or low, which are their private information. The contest organizer observes the players’ values ex post, and she can commit ex ante to four different symmetric information policies exhaustively. First, she can always disclose publicly the types of the players regardless. Second, she can conceal the types of the players regardless. Third, she can disclose publicly the players types if and only if both are of high type. Fourth, she can disclose publicly the players types if and only if both are of low type. We characterize explicitly the unique equilibrium for every scenario. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we are able to completely rank the four disclosure policies by the expected efforts induced, players expected payoffs and prize allocation efficiency.